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Emergence of the "Tender Years"
Doctrine: Too Young to Drink,
but Capable of Escaping the
Civil Consequences?
WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON*
California' appellate courts have invariably rejected the liq-
uor furnisher's 2 civil liability for damages beyond the premises 3
* Instructor in Law, Western State Uriiversity. B.A., University of
Pittsburgh, 1967; J.D., California Western School of Law, 1974; LL.M., Columbia
University, 1975.
1. Under limited circumstances, other state courts have held a tavern
owner civilly liable to a patron. See, e.g., McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168, 48 Am.
Rep. 260 (1883) (owner's consumption wager as to patron); Woodring ex rel.
Woodring v. Jacobino, 54 Wash. 504, 103 P. 809 (1909) (habitual patron starting
brawl); Riden v. Grimm Bros., 97 Tenn. 220, 36 S.W. 1097 (1896) (written notice
not to serve particular patron).
2. This article focuses upon the status of the plaintiff drinker which pre-
cludes recovery in negligence from any furnisher of alcoholic beverages. Hence,
no distinction is made as to liability: (1) of social hosts (see Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d
1285 (1973); (2) for irregular sales (see Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1412 (1966); (3) for gifts
(see Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 833 (1961); (4) of patricular owners (see Annot., 18
A.L.R.3d 1323 (1968). The terms seller, vendor, tavern owner, furnisher and
server are therefore used interchangeably.
3. This article does not deal with a tavern owner's on-premises liability to a
patron. See generally Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345,289 P.2d 450 (1955) (decedent
incurred by any patron, resulting from the latter's intoxication.4
A recent decision negated the use of comparative negligence to
impose liability on the patron, at least in the case of adult
plaintiffs.5 On June 2, 1977, a trial court's decision of first
impression, holding that a tavern owner might be found liable to
a minor patron,6 was denied appellate review on procedural
grounds. 7
This article will review judicial and legislative reaction to
pressures to extend the server's liability to his patron. The un-
reasonableness of the tender years rationale, which has been
asserted to establish liability where none is generally believed to
exist,8 will be asserted in support of the conclusion that this
class of minor plaintiffs cannot be permitted to benefit from its
own wrongdoing. Potential defendants and their insurers must
not bear the intolerable economic burden of assuming primary
responsibility for consequences of drinking-related criminal
conduct of minors, which often defies the law of self-preserva-
tion.
I. RETREAT FROM COMMON LAW IMMUNITY
A. Liability to Third Party-Antecedent of
Liability to Patron
A vendor of alcoholic beverages had no common law liability
to his patron, nor to any third party injured as a result of con-
duct by an intoxicated patron.9 Nearly sixty years ago, the
struck head on pavement at bar door); Halford v. Dodot, 201 Ill. App. 50 (1915)
(patron assault on sheriff); Judson v. Parry, 38 Wash. 37, 80 P. 194 (190) (1905)
(patron shot by co-patron).
4. Carlisle v. Kanaywer, 24 Cal. App. 3d 587, 101 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1972). The
basis of this decision was the application of the contributory negligence doc-
trine. This rationale was confirmed in Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845,
129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976) subsequent to the establishment of comparative negli-
gence.
5. Id. at 853, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608. Dicta specifically noted the adult status
of the unsuccessful plaintiff.
6. Minute Order on Demurrer Blumenfeld v. Ronnie Bud, Inc., Civ. No. EA
C 23670 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., April 22, 1977).
7. Minute Order of Ronnie Bud Inc. v. Super. Ct., Civ. No. 51197 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 2, 1977). The substantive liability issue involved the "tender years" of
the seventeen year old patron who became excessively intoxicated just prior to
causing an automobile accident. Appellate review of the server's liability was
avoided by the conclusion that the facts did not warrant the extraordinary relief
sought by writ of mandate to vacate overruling of the demurrer of the defendant
server to the patron's complaint.
8. See generally text related to notes 23-41 infra.
9. Seibel v. Leach, 213 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939); Collier v. Stamatis, 63
Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945); Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949);
State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951); Nolan v. Morelli,
154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383 (1967).
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California Supreme Court had stated that the furnishing of
such beverages did not proximately cause injury to any third
party. 0
Judicial reasoning in two leading cases evidenced growing
dissatisfaction with this traditional common law approach as to
the innocent third party. A Federal District Court, interpreting
an Illinois statute prohibiting liquor sales to obviously intox-
icated persons, determined that Michigan third party plaintiffs
were proximately injured by illegal sales to intoxicated pa-
trons.1 1 That statute was construed as being enacted for the
protection of any member of the public who sustained injury as
a result of intoxication produced or augmented by the sale. 2 In
New Jersey, although the state's dramshop act had been re-
pealed, a widow successfully stated a cause of action under
common law negligence principles against a tavern owner who
served a minor patron driver. 13 This result further evidenced
creation of a tavern owner's liability to third parties where a
sale to a minor resulted in a clearly foreseeable and unreason-
able risk of harm to others.14
In 1971, the Supreme Court of California reevaluated 5 its com-
mon law position that voluntary consumption, rather than the
sale or gift of intoxicating liquor, proximately causes drinking-
related injuries.16 After considering the abrogation of tavern
owners liability to third party persons in other jurisdictions, it
held that a sale to an obviously intoxicated person violated the
intent of the legislature 17 to protect members of the general
public from injury resulting from a patron's excessive con-
10. Lammers v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 186 Cal. 379, 384, 199 P. 523, 525
(1921).
11. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (1959).
12. Id. at 325.
13. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
14. Id. at 201, 256 A.2d at 8.
15. Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943) (no liability to
patron); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949) (no liability
to third party).
16. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). The primary
emphasis was placed upon duty, rather than causation, with the result that the
server's breach of duty to the public under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 and
CAL. EVID. CODE § 669 renders him liable to the third party innocent-driver.
17. The Alcoholic Beverages Control Act makes it a misdemeanor to fur-
nish alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person. CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 25602 (West 1964).
sumption. 18 Judicial emphasis was shifted from the drinker's
causation to the vendor's duty to the public. This decision
facilitated the infusion into California jurisprudence of the na-
tional trend toward negligence per se for liquor vendors, in
regard to injured third parties. The furnisher of alcoholic bever-
ages now shares with the patron the legal responsibility for
losses clearly forseeable in an unreasonable risk to third parties
in the patron's drunken behavior.
B. Current Non-Liability to Patron
It is well established that the recipient of intoxicating bever-
ages cannot state a cause of action in negligence against the
supplier. 19 No California decision has held to the contrary.
20
Furthermore, the common law does not make an exception
allowing an intoxicated minor to sue the furnisher of alcoholic
beverages for his drinking related injuries.21
The underlying rationale stems from the common law22 con-
cept of in pari delicto.23 As succinctly stated by Professor Pros-
ser, public policy dictates that:
[N]o one should be rewarded with damages for his own voluntary
participation in a wrong, particularly where, as is usually the case, he
himself commits a crime; that the state is fully able to protect itself by
a criminal prosecution; and that the parties, if they give any thought to
the law at all, which is quite improbable, are quite as likely to be
encouraged by the hope that if they get hurt they can still win in
court.
24
California courts have uniformly utilized this concept to pre-
vent the customer from recouping self-inflicted damages from
his vendor.
In Cooper v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. ,25 negligent
service of intoxicating beverages to a railroad passenger, in
18. See Comment, Dram Shop Liability-A Judicial Response, 57 CAL. L.
REV. 995, 996 n.6 (1969).
19. Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976); Car-
lisle v. Kanawyer, 24 Cal. App. 3d 587, 101 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1972); Sargent v.
Goldberg, 25 Cal. App. 3d 940, 102 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1972).
20. The lone California trial court finding of such liability known to the
author is that cited in text related to notes 6 and 7, supra.
21. Westbrook v. Miller, 98 App. Div. 590, 90 N.Y.S. 558 (1904); Cavin v.
Smith, 228 Minn. 322, 37 N.W.2d 368 (1949); Vallentine v. Azar, 8 Ariz. App. 247,
445 P.2d 449 (1968).
22. Matthews v. Ollerton, Comb. 218, 90 Eng. Rep. 438 (1693).
23. The phrase is technically defined as "In equal fault; equally culpable or
criminal; in a case of equal fault or guilt." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 898 (Rev.
4th ed. 1968).
24. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 107 (4th ed. 1971) (empha-
sis added).
25. 45 Cal. App. 3d 389, 119 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1975).
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violation of California Business and Professions Code § 25602,26
failed to support a cause of action by the passenger's heir
against the server.17 Relying upon decisions2 8 subsequent to Ves-
ley v. Sager,29 the court held that the extension of the seller's
liability to third parties did not alter the existing rule of non-
liability to the drinker. The court noted that:
[WIhile the bartender who serves alcoholic beverages to an obviously
intoxicated patron is violating the criminal law (Bus. & Prof. Code, §
25602) the patron is likewise violating the criminal law by being drunk
in a public place (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (f)). We have here a classic in-
stance of parties in pari delicto or equal criminal fault and in their
relationship to one another the law normally leaves the parties in the
condition it finds them.3 0
The heir was not permitted to shift responsibility for intoxica-
tion-induced injury from the customer to the server.3 1
The vendee's violation of a minor criminal statute constitutes
a sufficient basis for barring the vendee's negligence suit
against the vendor. In Rose v. International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers,32 the face of the Complaint demonstrated
that the patron violated California Penal Code § 647 (f),33 being
drunk in a public place. Plaintiff's decedent was in pari delicto
with the defendant vendor who illegally served his obviously
intoxicated vendee in violation of the law. 34 Rose's violation of
26. Any person who furnishes alcoholic beverages to an obviously intox-
icated person is guilty of a misdemeanor. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West
1964).
27. Cooper v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 389, 395,
119 Cal. Rptr. 541, 545 (1975). The Court reversed dismissal of the second speci-
fication of negligence regarding the common carrier's failure to furnish safe
passage facilities.
28. Sargent v. Goldberg, 25 Cal. App. 3d 940,102 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1972) (liquor
store operator's demurrer to complaint sustained since seller liable to general
public but not to drinker or his heirs); Carlisle v. Kanaywer, 24 Cal. App. 3d 587,
101 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1972) (drinker's excessive consumption causing him to choke
to death in his own vomit bars the heirs' recovery against tavern owner).
29. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
30. Cooper v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 389, 394,
119 Cal. Rptr. 541, 544-45 (1975).
31. Cooper was decided prior to the adoption of comparative negligence.
For a decision in the same appellate district stating that comparative negligence
would not have altered the applicability of in pari delicto in Cooper, see Rose v.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 58 Cal. App. 3d 276, 280, 129
Cal. Rptr. 736, 738 (1976).
32. 58 Cal. App. 3d at 279-80, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
33. This brand of disorderly conduct constituted a misdemeanor. CAL. PEN-
AL CODE § 647 (f) (West Supp. 1975).
34. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1964).
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but one 35 relatively minor criminal statute resulted in dismissal
because tort law leaves parties sharing criminal fault where it
finds them.
Judicial application of the doctrine of in pai delicto to bar
the server's liability to the drinker is reflected in decisions sub-
sequent to Nga Li v. Yellow Cab. Co.,36 which established the
doctrine of comparative negligence in California. In Kindt v.
Kauffman,37 a customer served while obviously intoxicated was
found to be guilty of willful misconduct rather than mere negli-
gent misconduct when he was subsequently injured in a car
collision.
Kauffman served Kindt, who was obviously intoxicated. Kindt
thereafter operated his automobile, apparently in violation of
the Motor Vehicle Code,38 whereby he sustained personal injury
in a collision. The majority reasoned that the drunken driver
was not merely negligent. He proceeded to consume alcohol in
sufficient quantity to bring about the predictable result.3 9 The
court rejected the argument that the comparative negligence
doctrine of Li4 included a correlative doctrine of comparative
willful misconduct.41
Li does not operate to extend the tavern owner's liability to the
drunken patron. Permitting such liability would allow culpable
parties to escape an accounting for their misdeeds in spite of the
doctrine of in pani delicto which denies recovery under these
circumstances. As aptly stated by the court:
Heretofore, no recovery has been allowed such a plaintiff; to now
allow it in any degree would be to award a pure and simple financial
windfall to an underserving plaintiff, which no amount of temporal
theorizing can change.
4 2
The Kindt Court did not, however, condone the seller's viola-
tion of state criminal statutes. A rule of seller's liability would
shield patrons engaging in illegal liquor consumption. They
would not be civilly answerable for the results of their criminal
35. The trial court relied, inter alia, upon the Penal Code violation to
support its dismissal, which was affirmed in an appellate opinion additionally
noting existence of the patron's Motor Vehicle Code violation.
36. 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
37. 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976).
38. It is unlawful for any person to operate a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102(a) & (b) (West Supp. 1976).
39. Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 852, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 608
(1976).
40. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). See note 36, supra.
41. Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 853, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 608
(1976).
42. Id. at 857, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
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conduct such as being drunk in public,43 operating a motor
vehicle under the influence of alcohol, 44 and drinking under
age.4
5
This concern prompted the California Legislature to specific-
ally decline extension of the tavern owner's civil liability to the
patron. In 1972 the Ketchum Bill 46 was introduced shortly after
judicial establishment of server's liability to third parties.4 7 This
Bill constituted the sole legislative attempt to establish the ven-
dor's liability to the vendee for breach of due care in serving the
vendee.48 Although subsequently amended 49 and passed"° by the
Assembly, the Ketchum Bill died in the Senate.5 1 The Legisla-
ture thereby joined two appellate courts52 in rejecting assertions
that the adult patron occupies the same position as the innocent
third party damaged by the not so innocent patron.5 3
Recent attempts to generate server liability to minor patrons
5 4
foreshadow a significant case of first impression in this area
where there is generally thought to be no liability. A number of
theories have been asserted in various jurisdictions to support
establishment of vendor civil liability to minor vendees. This
article will now demonstrate the impropriety of compensating
the minor patron pursuant to these arguments.
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (f) (West supp. 1977).
44. CAL. VEI. CODE § 23102 (a) & (b) (West Supp. 1977).
45. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658 (b) (West 1964).
46. Assembly Bill No. 1864, March 15, 1972, 1 Cal. Ass. J. 1066 (1972). As-
semblyman Ketchum sought insertion of a new Civil Code § 1714.8 designed to
hold the seller liable to the buyer by reason of failure to exercise due care in
management of his property or person so as to curb violations of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act related to drunken driving.
47. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
48. See generally Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845,851,129 Cal. Rptr.
603, 607 (1976).
49. 3 CAL. Ass. J. 4960, June 16, 1972.
50. 4 CAL. Ass. J. 5919, July 6,1972.
51. 5 CAL. Ass. J. 8751, Jan. 2, 1973.
52. Carlisle v. Kanaywer, 24 Cal. App. 3d 587, 101 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1972);
Sargent v. Goldberg, 25 Cal. App. 3d 940, 102 Cal. Rptr.,300 (1972).
53. Three appellate courts have subsequently denied additional attempts to
extend the server's liability to the patron. Kindt v. Kauffman, 67 Cal. App. 3d
845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1976); Rose v. International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, 58 Cal. App. 3d 276, 129 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1976); Cooper v. National
Railroad Passenger Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 389, 119 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1975).
54. See, e.g., text related to notes 6 and 7 supra.
II. THE PREMISES REEVALUATED
A. Tender Years Dicta
The California prohibition against serving alcoholic bever-
ages to a minor, 55 whether or not intoxicated, is noted in appel-
late dicta recognizing special plaintiffs deserving of extensive
protection of the laws. In Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co. ,56
the Court of Appeal reversed the sustaining of a general demur-
rer in a personal injury action against the employer of an intox-
icated minor employee whose vehicle injured plaintiffs.57 The
court held that an employer is liable, as is a commercial vendor,
to third parties injured by reason of the illegal furnishing of
alcohol to a minor, with knowledge that the minor would drive
upon public highways. 58 As stated by the court:
Section 25658 was adopted . . . presumably because the legislative
body believed that most minors are neither physically or mentally
equipped to handle the consumption of intoxicating liquor.
Section 25658 is directed to a special class; it pertains to young people
who because of their tender years and inexperience are unable to cope
with the inbibing of alcoholic beverages. 9
It is readily evident that such statutory provisions prohibiting
certain transactions with minors were designed to protect
minors from harmful influences. 60 However, such expressions
of the legislature should not be recharacterized to establish civil
liability for a harm which differs from that contemplated by the
statute. The quoted dictum dealt solely with the furnisher's lia-
bility to innocent third parties arising out of the risk creatinq act
of serving a great deal of liquor to a minor who was placed in his
vehicle by the employer and directed to drive home through
traffic. 61
In Kindt v. Kauffman,62 the Court of Appeal affirmed the
sustaining of the bar owner's general demurrer to an adult
customer's complaint. Incident to its determination that the
comparative negligence doctrine was inapplicable, the court
commented:
55. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25658 (a) & (c) (West 1964).
56. 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972).
57. Id. at 94, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
58. Id. at 93, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
59. Id. at 93-94, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 756 (emphasis added).
60. Lacabanne Properties, Inc. v. Dep't Alcoholic Bev. Control, 261 Cal.
App. 181, 188, 67 Cal. Rptr. 734, 739 (1968); People v. Baker, 38 Cal. App. 28.
61. Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 89, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 752, 753 (1972).
62. 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976).
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Let us note parenthetically that we are not here concerned with a
minor (citation omitted), nor with an alcoholic who suffers from an
irresistable and pathological urge to drink excessively. Such a person
may, in fact, be physically ill and incapable of. self-control, thus under
certain extremely limited and extraordinary circumstances not guil-
ty of willful misconduct. 3
This language is susceptible to judicial interpretation that
minor patrons may state a cause of action against the vendor.
Such a viewpoint is unsound, however. The quoted language is
drawn from a holding that did not actually require a plenary
determination of the comparative negligence issue.64 Further-
more, the quoted language demands the necessary inference
that only the most unusual circumstances could justify holding
the minor's conduct to be negligent,65 rather than willful. 66
Therefore, the judicial tone should be characterized as one of
hostility, rather than liberality, to the minor plaintiff on this
issue.
As California courts have not squarely dealt with the issue of
the minor patron plaintiff, more significant bases for predicting
the proper result must be analyzed. The premise that minors
constitute a class meriting civil protection must be scrutinized.
B. The Minor's Statutory Protection
The major impact of Vesely 67 involves highway safety. There
exists, however, no direct nexus between the vendor's violation
of an alcoholic beverage control act and the minor vendee's
injuries to himself. The National Insurance Institute for High-
way Safety has concluded that alcohol is a major factor in fatal
motor vehicle crashes,68 yet the National Social Science Insti-
tute has determined that taverns are not an important factor in
63. Id., at 853.
64. Id. at 860, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 613. Judgment at dismissal was entered prior
to finality of Li. The issue treated was whether Li also espoused a doctrine of
comparative willful conduct so as to abrogate the bar of in pari delicto.
65. If the minor's conduct is deemed mere negligence then the doctrine of in
pari delicto cannot bar his recover under comparative negligence.
66. If the minor's conduct is deemed willful, then the doctrine of in pari
delicto bars his recovery since Kindt prospectively mandates the inapplicabili-
ty of comparative negligence theories set forth under Li.
67. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971) (established ven-
dor's tort liability to third party injured by drunk patron).
68. Williams, Rich, Zador & Robertson, The Legal Minimum Drinking Age
and Fatal Motor Vehicle Crashes, 4 J. LEGAL STUDIEs 219, 220 (1975).
the production of alcoholic delinquency among minors.69 In
spite of such findings, various state alcohol control laws have
been urged in support of the proposition that minors, deserving
of special protection under the criminal law, are equally deserv-
ing civil plaintiffs."0
The 1977 tentative draft of the Restatement of Torts7 1 suggests
that a likely tool for asserting a civil remedy for a protected
class may be found in an existing criminal statute.7 2 It provides
that courts may extend such remedies to those deemed to be
within the statutorily-protected class to further the effective-
ness of the criminal statute.7 3 The minor patron's negligence
would be disregarded since the prohibition against serving a
minor assertedly places the entire responsibility on the defend-
ant furnisher,7 4 especially in the case of the minor7 5 who is
1
69. Sterne, Pittman & Coe, Teenagers, Drinking and the Law-A Study of
Arrest Trends for Alcohol-Related Offenses, 11 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 78, 81
(1965). The authors refer to the "[s]mall minority of them [tavernowners who]
capitalize on this opportunity for illicit business, catering to the teenage trade,
seldom checking ages .. " Id. at 81.
70. See, e.g., Comment, Dramshop Liability-A Judicial Response, 57 CAL.
L. REV. 995, 1025 (1969); Comment, Common Law Liability of Tavern Owners,
1971 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 645, 651 n.34 (1971); Keenan, Liquor Law Liability in
California, 14 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 46, 77 (1973); Comment, Civil Liability for
Furnishing Liquor in California, 5 PAC. L.J. 186, 201 n.98 (1974); Comment,
Intoxication-Liability and Recovery: A Practical Look at New York's Dram
Shop Act, 39 ALB. L. REV. 15, 21-23 (1974). For commentators' denials of patron
recovery, which do not distinguish between adults and minors, see Comment,
Civil Liability Under the Michigan Liquor Control Act, 46 J. URBAN LAW 87,
101 (1968); Schubert, The Iowa Dram Shop Act-Causes of Action and De-
fenses, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 16, 23 (1973); Comment, Intoxication: No longer a Bar
to Patron's Action Against Tavern Owner, 22 Loy. L. REV. 867, 874 (1976).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A at 65 (Tent. Draft No..23, 1977).
72. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658 (West 1964) which directs that:
(a) Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold,
furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage to any person under
the age of 21 years is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(c) Any on-sale licensee who knowingly permits a person under the
age of 21 years to consume any alcoholic beverage in the on-sale prem-
ises, whether or not the licensee has knowledge that the person is under
the age of 21 years, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
73. The Draft creates a tort action for violation of a legislative provision:
When a legislative provision proscribes or requires certain conduct for
the benefit of a class of persons but does not provide a civil remedy for
the violation, the Court may, if it determines that the remedy is appro-
priate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to
assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member
of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a
new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A at 65 (Tent. Draft No. 23, 1977).
74. Regarding the effect of patron's negligence, the Restatement provides
that:
The plaintiff's contributory negligence bars his recovery for the negli-
gence of the defendant consisting of the violation of a statute unless the
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allegedly mentally deficient. 76
This Restatement transformation of criminal prohibition into
civil remedy for the protected class has been judicially relied
upon in other jurisdictions.77 It has been utilized to establish
liability to patrons where no legislative enactment has altered
the common law immunity of the furnisher of alcoholic bever-
ages.78 Such decisions typically reject the defendant vendor's
argument that the vendee plaintiff is not a member of the class
of persons intended to be protected by the applicable statute.
These jurisdictions thereby override the effect of the vendee's
contributory misconduct, even though he consciously and
voluntarily reduces himself to the state of intoxication.7 9
California rejected this approach in Carlisle v. Kanaywer, es-
tablishing that the defense of contributory negligence pre-
cluded the adult vendee's action, as the vendor's acts do not
effect of the statute is to place the entire responsibility for such harm
as has occurred upon the defendant.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 (1965) (emphasis added).
75. Regarding the standard of care applicable to children, the Restatement
provides that:
A child is a person of such immature years as to be incapable of
exercising the judgment. . and prudence demanded by the standard
of the reasonable man applicable to adults. The rule stated in this
Section is commonly applied to children of tender years.
Most of the cases which have applied the rule in this Section have
involved the contributory negligence of children where the reason for
special protection of them is readily apparent....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A, comment a at 14-15 (1965).
76. Regarding the effect of a mental deficiency, the Restatement provides
that:
Unless the actor is a child, his insanity or other mental deficiency does
not relieve the actor from liability for conduct which does not conform
to the standard of a reasonable man under like circumstances.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965) (emphasis added).
77. See, e.g., Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15, 19 (1961); Majors v. Brodhead
Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 269, 205 A.2d 873, 876 (1965); Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc.,
46 N.J. 582, 590, 218 A.2d 630, 635 (1966).
78. The text of most "dram shop" acts is set forth in Note, Private Individu-
als Who Furnish Alcoholic Beverages to Minors or Intoxicated Persons in
Violation of Law May Be Liable Under Provisions of Minnesota Dram Shop
Act for Injuries Sustained by Third Persons, 6 CREIGHTON L. REV. 106, n.32
(1973).
79. Relying upon the language of an 1861 decision, a frequently cited Penn-
sylvania lower appellate court reiterated that "[I]f the deceased [patron] was
already intoxicated, he was incapable of legal acts, like an idiot or child, and the
doctrine of concurring negligence is inapplicable."Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa.
Super. 341, 345 (1958).
transcend mere negligence" so as to thrust the patron into the
class of persons protected by the applicable statute.81 The Car-
lisle court implicitly rejected the theory8 2 that patron vendees
are entitled to bring civil actions. They are not within any
statutorily protected class envisioned by Vesely. 83 The patron's
contributory negligence therefore barred such a cause of action.
Subsequent to adoption of comparative negligence, the lead-
ing decision of Kindt v. Kauffman84 affirmed the bar to a pa-
tron's suit. The impeccable logic of that decision concludes that
a patron's recovery in any degree would only result in a windfall
to an undeserving plaintiff "which no amount of temporal
theorizing can change. ' 85 However, the Kindt court summarily
noted that the facts of the case did not involve a minor patron
plaintiff.86 This parenthetical reference may have surfaced due
to some limited, recurring authority relating to minors as a
special class to be shielded from the evils of liquor.8 One can
focus upon this legal gap involving minors only by a more com-
plete application of Restatement principles. Section 483 of the
Restatement has been cited as proposing that the vendor's statu-
tory negligence precludes his ability to allocate any fault to the
vendee.8 8 The Restatement logic regarding prohibitions against
sales of firearms to minors 89 and child labor9 . has appeared in
the decisions in some jurisdictions, 91 and in dicta in California, 92
encouraging the minor's recovery based on the defendant's
statutory negligence. The court in Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd
Motor Co. noted that the Legislature's codification of statutory
negligence in the California Evidence Code,93 coupled with the
80. 24 Cal. App. 3d 587, 591, 101 Cal. Rptr. 246, 248 (1972).
81. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1964) (serving an obviously intox-
icated person).
82. See note 77-79 and related text supra.
83. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). The Carlisle
Court, relying upon Vesely, which did not deal with serving a minor, appropri-
ately reasoned that "Vesely holds that the purpose of section 25602 is to protect
'members of the general public from injuries to person. . . resulting from the
excessive use of intoxicating liquor' [and] [t]hat purpose would be defeated by
the immunity appellants seek for the drinker himself." Carlisle v. Kanaywer, 24
Cal. App. 3d 587, 592, 101 Cal. Rptr. 246, 248 (1972).
84. 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976).
85. Id., at 857, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
86. Id., at 853, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608. See also Section II A. supra.
87. See notes 73-76 and related text supra.
88. See authorities cited in note 77 supra.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 483, Comment c (1965).
90. Id., Comment e.
91. See, e.g., Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So.2d 421, 423 (Fla. 1959).
92. Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 853, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 608
(1976).
93. Failure to exercise due care in presumed where a statutory violation
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presumption that most minors are incapable of properly con-
suming alcohol, allows for a recovery by "anyone who is in-
jured as a result of the minor's intoxication and for whose
benefit the statute was enacted. '94 An inference has been drawn
from this decision that the vendee minor is included within the
class compensable for drinking-related injuries. The alleged re-
sult is that the minor is not in pari delicto with the defendant
furnisher,95 since the child's standard of conduct need only con-
form to that of a person of like age, intelligence, and experience
under the circumstances. 96
None of the referenced decisions have properly taken into
account a rudimentary Restatement exception to the standard
of care applicable to the minor. The view of the American Law
Institute regarding a child engaging in an adult activity is that:
An exception to the rule stated in this Section [minor's special stan-
dard of care] may arise where the child engages in an activity which is
normally undertaken only by adults, and for which adult qualifica-
tions are required. 97
Certain activities engaged in by minors are so potentially
hazardous as to require that the minor be held to an adult
standard of care. It has been held that a child must exercise the
same standard of care as an adult motor vehicle driver.9 When
a minor operates a vehicle, he forfeits his right to have the
reasonableness of his conduct measured by a standard com-
mensurate with his age. As stated by a New York Court constru-
ing Restatement § 283A,99 the general interest in the welfare and
protection of infants is such that the Courts should draw upon
causes injury of the nature the statute was designed to prevent, and plaintiff is a
member of the class the statute was designed to protect. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669
(West Supp. 1977).
94. 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 93, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752, 756 (1972).
95. See, e.g., note 6 supra.
96. Regarding the minor's standard of care, the Restatement provides that
"[i]f the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to
avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and
experience under the circumstances." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A
(1965). For related Restatement commentary regarding special protection, see
note 75 supra.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A, Comment c (1965).
98. Prichard v. Veterans Cab Co., 63 Cal.2d 727, 47 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1965);
Daniels v. Evans, 107 N.H. 407, 224 A.2d 63 (1966); Dawson v. Hoffman, 43 Ill.
App. 2d 17, 192 N.E.2d 695 (1963); Williams v. Esaw, 214 Kan. 658, 522 P.2d 950
(1974).
99. See note 96 supra.
community experience in determining to what standard they
should be held.100
Minnesota's Supreme Court set forth the minor's duty of care,
when engaging in adult activities, by stating that:
[1]t would be unfair to the public to permit a minor to observe any
other standards of care and conduct than those expected of all
others .... 101
It is submitted that the same rationale applies to a minor's
conduct when he violates California's prohibitions against
drinking under age, 10 2 operating a motor vehicle under the influ-
ence of alcohol 10 3 or becoming drunk in public. 10 4 An adult's
violation of any of these statutes precludes recovery from the
furnisher under the doctrine of in pani delicto.1 0 5 Mischarac-
terizing the minor patron as a member of the general public
protected from the vendor's wrongdoing by way of civil remedy
would violate the common law maxim which prohibits one from
profiting by his own wrongdoing. 10 6 This would trigger a rash of
lawsuits by minor vendees to the detriment of the remaining
members of the class of "general public." The drinking minor
could breach the adult duty of care to innocent drivers, yet shift
some or all responsibility for criminal misconduct to the fur-
nisher. In this way, the governmental interest in protecting
minors from the evils of alcohol would be thwarted since they
could engage in this highly hazardous conduct, but escape the
civil consequences of their attempts to act as adults.
Thus there exists a strong policy argument for treating such
minors as adults. They engage in activities which community
experience has demonstrated to be hazardous, not only to them-
selves but to others. The innocent members of the general pub-
lic who drive or park along the primrose path, already have a
civil remedy for the furnisher's negligence.10 7 Extending protec-
tion to drinking minors, a hybrid class of natural adults who are
currently barred from recovery,10 8 would jeopardize clearly in-
nocent members of the class to whom the furnisher of alcoholic
100. Neumann v. Shlansky, 58 Misc.2d 128, 134, 294 N.Y.S. 2d 628, 633 (1968).
101. Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 458, 107 N.W.2d 859, 863 (1961).
102. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658 (c) (West 1964).
103. CAL. MOTOR VEH. CODE § 23102 (a) & (b) (West 1964).
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (f) (West Supp. 1975).
105. Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976); Car-
lisle v. Kanaywer, 24 Cal. App. 3d 587, 101 Cal. Rptr. (1972).
106. No one can take advantage of his own wrong. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3517
(West 1970).
107. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
108. Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976); Car-
lisle v. Kanaywer, 24 Cal. App. 3d 587, 101 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1972).
[Vol. 5: 1, 1977] The "Tender Years." Doctrine
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
beverages is duty-bound. Rulings in other jurisdictions, which
include all vendees within the protected class, °9 unwisely treat
the minor as an incompetent merely due to some preconceived
notion that he has no capacity to drink.
The express purposes of the California Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act is to eliminate the evils resulting from unlawful
disposition of alcohol and to promote temperance in the use and
consumption of alcohol. 10 These purposes would be far too
liberally construed were they to include the promotion of safety
if the alleged child portion of the class could profit from its risk
creating conduct. Self-policing by a minor provides the primary
defense against the evils of intoxication. Outside policing by the
furnisher plays only a secondary role. Failure of the minor
patron to control his own conduct should not be excused or
condoned by failure of the bartender to police the patron's
drinking. The person with primary responsibility is the minor
patron who should have no recourse for self-incurred losses
against the tavernowner. Willful criminal conduct of the minor
should prevent attempts to resort to the comparative negligence
doctrine to frustrate the in pani delicto bar to recovery."1 Inno-
cent members of the general public should not bear the risk that
tainted members of their class can undertake illegal liquor con-
sumption without being personally liable for their own crimin-
ally dangerous conduct. The minor patron, engaged in adult
activities, cannot be permitted to shift any responsibility for his
reckless disregard for the safety of others to the furnisher.
C. Criminal Prohibitions as a Rule of Civil Liability
A furnisher of alcoholic beverages violates California crimin-
al laws when he either serves a minor, 1 2 or serves an obviously
intoxicated one." 3 This conduct contravenes the policy of the
Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) Act that is to shield minors
from the evil of intemperance.'1 4 None of the ABC regulations
109. See note 77 supra.
110. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23001 (West 1964).
111. Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976).
112. CAL. BUS. & PROF CODE § 25658 (a) & (c) (West 1964).
113. CAL. Bus; & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1964).
114. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23001 (West 1964); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
25658(a) & (c) (West 1964).
provide a civil remedy, as permitted by statute'15 and case law' 16
in other jurisdictions.
The common law is typically composed of two separate ingre-
dients-criminal prohibitions to suppress the mischief and civil
prohibitions to advance related remedies. California's ABC Act
does not provide for civil remedies by anyone injured as a result
of its violations."7 It does provide that all provisions of the Act
are to be liberally construed for the accomplishment of its pur-
poses.118
California courts recognize that a criminal prohibition can
become a rule of civil liability. This occurs when the court is
willing to treat a breach of the criminal law as evidence of the
need for a controlling civil standard. 119 The existence of such a
criminal statute is only one element 2 ' in determining whether
the patron may shift responsibility for his willful misconduct to
the server. The courts should discourage violation of penal stat-
utes, yet doubt has been expressed that this end should be
sought through the medium of civil litigation.' 2'
Governmental interests may be protected by strictly enforced
criminal sanctions. A minor patron, already aware that he re-
ceives special criminal treatment under the law, would be en-
couraged by the prospect that if he is injured by his illegal
drinking he can still prosecute the server in a civil suit. This
115. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1964), which expre-
ssly provides for exemplary damages.
116. Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post No. 2665, 97 Ill. App. 2d 139, 239
N.E.2d 856 (1968), imposing liability on the server even where the sale is legal.
117. But see Note, Private Individual Who Furnish Alcoholic Beverages to
Minors or Intoxicated Persons in Violation of Law May be Liable Under Provi-
sions of Minnesota Dram Shop Act for Injuries Sustained by Third Persons, 6
CREIGHTON L. REV. at 106, n.32 (1973), for a collection of ABC Acts which provide
for civil damages (none expressly in favor of patron).
118. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23001 (West 1964). Civil Damage Acts in other
jurisdictions, penal in nature but remedial in character, have been traditionally
construed so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. Mead v.
Stratton, 87 N.Y. 493, 41 Am. Rep. 386 (1882); Buckmaster v. McElroy, 20 Neb.
557, 31 N.W. 76, 57 Am. Rep. 843 (1886); Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d
708 (1949).
119. Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal.2d 72, 75, 136 P.2d 777, 778 (1943) (driver
negligent per se not withstanding defect in ordinance's authorization); Alber v.
Owens, 66 Cal.2d 790, 798, 427 P.2d 781, 787, 59 Cal. Rptr. 117, 123 (1967) (injured
employee not contributorily negligent due to employer's violation of safety
statute).
120. Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845,854, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603,609 (1976)
(tavern owner not liable to patron).
121. Sayadoff v. Warda, 125 Cal. App. 2d 626, 271 P.2d 140 (1954); Kindt v.
Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 857, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 611 (1976).
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conduct would result in no complaint if the minor drank with-
out incident, but a windfall civil recovery otherwise.
D. Li's Effect Upon the Post-Vesely Decisions
Proponents of minor patron recovery will argue that post-
Vesely 122 decisions,'12 denying recovery to the patron, have been
undercut by Li's1 24 adoption of comparative negligence. As ar-
gued by the strong dissent in Kindt v. Kauffman,25 the post-
Vesely decisions barring patrons from recovery under the doc-
trines of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk
have lost their precendential force as a result of Li.126 The thrust
of the dissent in Kindt was that the majority's characterization
of the patron's conduct as willful, so that comparative negli-
gence is not an applicable remedy, is a question of fact rather
than law. 27 Based upon this premise, the next link in the argu-
ment supporting patron recovery is that a violation of the stat-
ute prohibiting service to a minor is far different in kind than
serving an obviously intoxicated adult. Thus a legal determina-
tion that the child is incapable of willful misconduct is war-
ranted.
The child undertaking such willful misconduct cannot be
deemed merely negligent so as to bring his conduct within the
ambit of comparative negligence. Allowing the minor patron's
lawsuit would improperly free him from the reasonable man
standard required by Carlisle1 28 and the Restatement. 29
The minor patron shares equal criminal fault with the server.
The acts of consuming alcohol and driving under the influence
122. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
123. Carlisle v. Kanaywer, 24 Cal. App. 3d 587, 101 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1972);
Sargent v. Goldberg, 25 Cal. App. 3d 940, 102 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1972); Cooper v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 389, 119 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1975);
Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976); Rose v.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 58 Cal. App. 3d 276, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 736 (1976).
124. Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
125. 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976).
126. Id., at 864, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
127. Id. at 866, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
128. Carlisle v. Kanaywer, 24 Cal. App. 3d 587, 591, 101 Cal. Rptr. 246, 248
(1972).
129. See Section II B. supra, setting forth the argument that engaging in an
adult activity subjects the minor to the standard of care required of an adult.
of alcohol demonstrate willful disregard for the minor's own
safety. Therefore, comparative negligence concepts have no ap-
plication when the party seeking recovery has been guilty of
wanton misconduct. The furnisher does not participate in the
self-policing relationship of the minor to himself, nor of the
parent to the minor. The rash of lawsuits, likely to flow from
permitting minor patron recovery, would result in no foresee-
able change in the rate of adherence to the law prohibiting
service of alcohol to minors. Increased tavern owner insurance
premiums, the cost of which will be born by the drinking public
to cover the additional civil liability, would do little to
strengthen existing criminal sanctions.
E. Extending Liability or Judicial Legislation
The ABC Act extends no civil remedy to anyone injured as a
result of violations. It may, however, be argued that the courts
are free to construe the common law so as to hold a server civilly
liable to a minor drinker. The California Supreme Court has
determined that the common law extends such a remedy to
third parties,1 30 specifically reserving the issue of patron recov-
ery for a future date.131 California's lower appellate courts have
evidenced concern about extending the rule of liability to the
patron in view of the State Supreme Court's restraint.132
The legislature declined to extend Civil Code § 25602133 to
create civil liability to the injured patron, just after the State
Supreme Court extended it to innocent third parties.134 Al-
though there has been no legislative attempt to create civil lia-
bility on the server under Civil Code § 25658,135 it is submitted
that broad social and economic ramifications of this issue
should be analyzed by the Legislature rather than by judicial
fiat in a limited factual context. A California court recently
acknowledged deference to the legislature on this issue by the
Connecticut Supreme Court:
130. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
131. Id., at 157, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 625. The lower appellate courts have decided
this issue against, at least, the adult patron. See authorities cited in note 123
supra.
132. As stated in the first post- Vesely decision, "[in light of that purposeful
restraint, it hardly benefits a lower court to expand the role in this new and
potentially dangerous field." Carlisle v. Kanaywer, 24 Cal. App. 3d 587, 592, 101
Cal. Rptr. 246, 248 (1972).
133. See note 26, supra, and see text related to notes 46-51 supra, regarding
the illegal serving of an obviously intoxicated customer.
134. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
135. One cannot furnish alcoholic beverages to a minor. CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 25658 (a) & (c) (West 1964).
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To recompense in damages in injury to an intoxicated person or his
property resulting from his own overindulgence in intoxicating liquor
might, quite properly, be felt by the General Assembly to encourage,
rather than to discourage, such overindulgence. 3 '
The California legislature has already considered the issue of
patron recovery in the context of § 25602.137 The acts or omis-
sions covered by this section are sufficiently related to § 25658138
and the minor patron recovery issue to suggest that judicial
restraint remains appropriate until the legislature has decided
to reconsider patron recovery.
III. CONCLUSION
Concededly, the vendor could obtain insurance coverage
against the additional risk inherent in becoming civilly liable to
minor patrons and can recover his increased premiums by re-
lated price increases. Even without such insurance, he usually is
in a better position to assume the loss. Holding him liable to
minor patrons might encourage greater care to serve only
adults, as required by law. The flaw fatal to this conclusion is
that a nexus exists between risk shifting and the desired result
of reducing drunk driving by teenagers.
National studies show that the tavern is of little consequence in
juvenile misconduct.139 Vendor liability to such a patron would
encourage further disregard of the criminal law by those unde-
serving minors engaged in the adult activities of drinking and
driving. Stricter law enforcement, 140 by way of Criminal sanc-
tions for both furnisher and consumer, rather than windfall
civil recovery by the latter, constitutes the most acceptable
means of resolving this social problem. To compensate a crimin-
al for injuries incurred in the commission of a crime is a wholly
irrational approach to crime reduction, and has no place in
California jurisprudence.
136. Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 440, 226 A.2d 383, 387 (1967), cited in
Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 851, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 607 (1976).
137. See text related to notes 46-51 supra.
138. See note 135 supra.
139. See note 69 and related text supra.
140. See generally Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845,859 n.6, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 603, 612 n.6 (1976).

